How relevant to the psychology of mindreading is knowledge-first epistemology?
Could mindshaping be the bedrock of human social cognition?
If teleology is the answer, what was the question?
Are human toddlers unable to understand the aspectuality of a puppet’s belief that the bunny is not a carrot?
What does the infant brain tell us about human Theory of Mind?
Children’s grasp of the aspectuality of beliefs: the Sefo task revisited
Is submentalizing part of the genetic tool-kit of human social cognition?
Findings from the developmental investigation of false-belief understanding in preverbal human infants, based on looking time (and other kinds of looking behavior) are relevant to hypotheses about the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic origins of human mindreading capacities. According to Cecilia Heyes (2012), “recent empirical work in comparative psychology, developmental psychology and cognitive neuroscience provides surprisingly little evidence of genetic adaptation, and ample evidence of cultural adaptation.”