Christophe Heintz blogged about this on these very pages some years ago<\/a>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\nRunciman observes in his review that today’s enemies of the open society “have become more adaptable\u2026 often pay[ing] lip service to the idea of openness”. Also: \u201ctoday\u2019s conspiracy theorists are\u2026 opportunistic\u2026 They fit their theories to a rapidly changing landscape… adapting to the circumstances as they arise.\u201d In other words: enemies of the open society are doing just what scientists do when their ideas are challenged! In neither case are good counter arguments straight-forwardly accepted. Counter-counter-arguments are sought instead.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
To be clear: I\u2019m not suggesting that scientists have the sort of motivations that enemies of the open society seem to. What I\u2019m pointing out is the similarity in epistemic practice. There are, clearly, many differences between the politician and the scientist, but one thing they share is that when ideas are challenged they do not often reason in a Socratic way, treating arguments simply and only on their merits. Instead, they reason in an argumentative way, searching for whatever counter arguments might best persuade their target audience. In the political case, just as in science, this can mean developing ad hoc additional theories to explain why they were right all along. The conspiracy is simply one type of additional theory, albeit an often potent one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
None of this should be too surprising: argumentation is, after all, how people reason in general (Mercier & Sperber, 2017). To counter these tendencies we need, in science and society both, institutions and practices that function to keep us on the epistemic straight and narrow. In ways that are imperfect but nevertheless in the right direction, this is what peer review and open research practices do for science; and what democratic accountability and a free press do for society.<\/p>\n\n\n
\n\n\nReferences<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\nIgnatieff, M., & Roch, S. (Eds.) (2018). Rethinking the Open Society: New Adversaries and New Opportunities<\/em>. CEU Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\nMercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2017). The Enigma of Reason<\/em>. Harvard University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\nPopper, K. (1952). The Open Society & Its Enemies (2nd edition)<\/em>. Routledge.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"In the latest issue of the Times Literary Supplement, David Runciman reviews \u2018Rethinking the Open Society: New Adversaries and New Opportunities\u2019 (paywall). The book is a collection of essays, edited by Michael Ignatieff and Stefan Roch, that grew out of a lecture series at Central European University looking at the idea of the open society […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1048,"featured_media":9728,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[285],"tags":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Open science, open society - International Cognition and Culture Institute<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n