{"id":715,"date":"2009-12-07T00:00:07","date_gmt":"2009-12-06T23:00:07","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/?p=715"},"modified":"2023-08-22T11:46:07","modified_gmt":"2023-08-22T09:46:07","slug":"the-scope-of-natural-pedagogy-theory-ii-uniquely-human","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/pierre-jacob\/the-scope-of-natural-pedagogy-theory-ii-uniquely-human\/","title":{"rendered":"The scope of natural pedagogy theory (II): uniquely human?"},"content":{"rendered":"
This is the second post in a series of two installments by Pierre Jacob, dwelling on Gergely and Csibra’s work on human communication. In Pierre’s first post, we saw that these experiments show that, as suggested by relevance theory, human can detect communicative intentions quite early. Now Pierre turns to a second issue.<\/em><\/p>\n
Natural pedagogy has also recently cast an interesting light onto the second question raised by Sperber and Wilson\u2019s (1986) relevance approach to ostensive-inferential communication: to what extent is it distinctive of human cognition? Unlike great apes, domesticated dogs have co-evolved with humans for several thousand years. As a result and unlike great apes, they are widely believed to exhibit some understanding of human referential intentions expressed in communicative gestures, such as pointing (Hare and Tomasello, 2005). Range, Viranyi and Huber (2007) have adapted Gergely et al.\u2019s (2002) paradigm to test the propensity of domestic dogs to engage in the selective imitation of a model\u2019s behavior.<\/p>\n