Explanation 1: meta-gullibility<\/span><\/h3>\nOne possible explanation is that there is an asymmetry between people\u2019s own vulnerability to bad arguments (which is not very high) and their estimate of other people\u2019s vulnerability (very high).<\/p>\n
As Hugo Mercier demonstrates in a recent paper, the experimental record shows that it is very difficult to make people entertain\u00a0 strange or absurd or counter-intuitive beliefs. Humans are just not very easy to persuade of complete nonsense (Mercier 2017). But, as Mercier adds, one thing we often do<\/i> believe without much evidence is that others will believe just about anything. The only domain where we are really gullible is our estimate of other people\u2019s gullibility.\u00a0To coin a phrase, humans are not gullible but they seem really meta-gullible.<\/p>\n
So perhaps people use ad hominem<\/i> and other absurd non-arguments because they mistakenly over-estimate their epistemic effects on listeners.<\/p>\nOnly politics can make you that willfully stupid<\/span><\/h3>\nBut that may be only part of the explanation, because the use of abusive rhetoric seems uniquely frequent in the political domain. It is in politics that people call an adversary a drunk baboon, as Lincoln was described by the Democratic party, as a supposedly powerful argument against the abolitionist cause.<\/p>\n
That is of course not the only damage politics inflicts on people\u2019s intellects. Living among academics, it is of course always a wonder to witness how people who display great sophistication in understanding multiple intertwined factors, or the way some variable modulate the interaction between tow other factors, etc., suddenly turn into four-year olds when they talk about politics. It is a wonder that the same people, who are so careful with the logic of arguments, suddenly get into a passionate refutation that b<\/i> could possibly imply a<\/i>, when all you suggested to them was that perhaps a <\/i>implies b<\/i>.<\/p>\n
Why does it happen specifically in that domain?<\/p>\n
Explanation 2: signaling one\u2019s affiliation<\/span><\/h3>\nThe special factor about politics is that a) it seems to be about arguments, for or against particular policies, but b) it is of course mostly motivated by coalitional psychology. The point is to build and sustain an alliance with strong cooperation and diminish the recruitment potential of other alliances, in what is clearly construed as a zero-sum competition for social support (Pietraszewski, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 2010). <\/span><\/p>\nSeen from this angle, Cathy Newman\u2019s majestic displays of stupidity make more sense. Newman is signaling to her friends or allies that she is so strongly opposed to Peterson and his conservative views that she will use absurd distortion and insulting comments, rather than engage with and discuss any of his arguments. Sure, that makes her sound like a bit of a simpleton. But the point is that people now know very clearly where she stands.<\/p>\n
This would make sense, because an interview is always an ambiguous process. A good journalist should get the interviewee to provide the clearest possible expression of their views. But this may be easily mistaken for support. And, as it happens, many journalists owe their jobs as much to partisan affiliation as to reporting skills or interview technique. So this ambiguity may be particularly damaging. Hence the need for signaling.<\/p>\n
Signaling would be a fine explanation, but\u2026 the rhetoric used by Newman (and other people in such debates) also conveys incompetence, which is not optimal if you want to recruit people. An uncommitted third-party may watch that extraordinary interview and walk away with the impression that Newman\u2019s \u201ccamp\u201d, whatever it is, probably does not have good arguments at all.<\/p>\n
So, would the signaling advantage of\u00a0 really\u00a0bad<\/em> arguments over-ride their implications about competence? Does this happen only when the “camps” are so clearly antagonistic that trying to appear competent is entirely redundant?<\/p>\nDoes it make sense to signal incompetence?<\/span><\/h3>\nI offer these reflections as conjectures. The cognition and culture community should tell us, whether these two explanations make sense, and whether there is any evidence for the contribution of meta-gullibility and signaling.<\/p>\n
\nReferences<\/h3>\n Mercier, H. (2017). How gullible are we? A review of the evidence from psychology and social science. Review of General Psychology, 21(2), 103-122.<\/p>\n
Pietraszewski, D. (2013). What is group psychology? Adaptations for mapping shared intentional stances. In M. R. Banaji, S. A. Gelman, M. R. Banaji & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Navigating the social world: What infants, children, and other species can teach us.<\/i> (pp. 253-257). New York, NY, US: Oxford University Press.<\/p>\n
Tooby, J., & Cosmides, L. (2010). Groups in Mind: The Coalitional Roots of War and Morality. In H. H\u00f8gh-Olesen (Ed.), Human Morality & Sociality: Evolutionary & Comparative Perspectives<\/i> (pp. 191-234). New York: Palgrave MacMillan.<\/p>\n
van Eemeren, F. H., Garssen, B., & Meuffels, B. (2012). The disguised abusivead hominem empirically investigated: Strategic manoeuvring with direct personal attacks. Thinking & Reasoning, 18<\/i>(3), 344-364. doi: 10.1080\/13546783.2012.678666<\/p>\n
van Eemeren, F. H., & Grootendorst, R. (2015). The history of the argumentum ad hominem since the seventeenth century Reasonableness and Effectiveness in Argumentative Discourse<\/i> (pp. 611-629): Springer.<\/p>\n
Walton, D. N. (2000). Case Study of the Use of a Circumstantial Ad Hominem in Political Argumentation. Philosophy and Rhetoric, 33<\/i>(2), 101-115.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
A few weeks ago, a TV interview\u00a0of clinical psychologist Jordan Peterson by journalist Cathy Newman became a minor Internet phenomenon, thanks to the journalist’s extraordinary interviewing style. She handled the conversation so badly that the Atlantic commented on that car-crash of an interview under the title Why Can’t People Hear What Jordan Peterson Is Saying? […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":714,"featured_media":6794,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[23],"tags":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
\u201cSo you\u2019re saying \u2026 we should live like lobsters?\u201d or: Why does politics make us stupid? - International Cognition and Culture Institute<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n