{"id":627,"date":"2009-01-29T10:37:24","date_gmt":"2009-01-29T09:37:24","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/?p=627"},"modified":"2023-07-24T13:43:39","modified_gmt":"2023-07-24T11:43:39","slug":"how-automatic-are-human-social-skills","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/olivier-morin\/how-automatic-are-human-social-skills\/","title":{"rendered":"How automatic are human social skills?"},"content":{"rendered":"
This January in Biology and Philosophy [1], philosopher Mitch Parsell questions the view that some parts of social cognition, like face-perception or gaze-following, are independent mechanisms working independently from other cognitive processes – what philosophers call “informational encapsulation”. I cut-and-pasted a few excerpts.<\/p>\n
This is a face with a pair of eyes. Your eyes are sensitive to the label attached to this picture; your attentional response would have been different if it had read “this is a car” (Kingstone et al. 2004<\/a>).<\/p>\n