“converges with other recent findings and tentatively supports the notion that religion may have coevolved with complex societies to facilitate larger-scale interactions.”<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\nHowever, it could be very easily the other way around! Indeed, world religions naturally enjoy a better success in bigger societies where people are used to share ownership. Due to their universalistic perspective, they look much more relevant for potential believer than ethnically bounded religion. Consequently, world religions, market integration and joint ownership are very likely to covary not because world religions cause or select joint ownership but rather because market integration (and bigger societies) makes world religion more relevant (which then covaries with joint ownership in economic games). Thus, an innate preference for fairness is not only fully compatible with Henrich et al.’s results. It is also theoretically more parsimonious and empirically more valid.<\/p>\n
This explanation based on an innate sense of fairness also fits better with the economic literature on institutions and cooperation. Indeed, contrary to what the authors suggest, Nobel prize economists Douglass North and Elinor Ostrom have shown that variability in cooperation is not explained by different norms but rather by different system of incentives (reward and penalties) organized by local communities or States (see my previous post on Ostrom). What institutions do is to add some further incentives to cooperate on top of morality. Take the case of taxes for instance. I may think that we ought to pay our taxes but be tempted to hidden some of my revenues. Luckily (for the public good), the tax controller is here to motivate me to declare everything. In other words, institutions do not transform people’s values. Everywhere people think that public benefits and public burdens should be shared in a fair way. Institutions just make easier to share these benefits and burdens.<\/p>\n
(An extended version of this argument can be found here<\/a>)<\/p>\n \n\n\n[1] Oxoby, R. J., & Spraggon, J. (2008). Mine and yours: Property rights in dictator games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65(3-4)<\/em>, 703-713.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[2] Cherry, T. L., Frykblom, P., & Shogren, J. F. (2002). Hardnose the dictator. American Economic Review, 92(4)<\/em>, 1218-1221.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[3] Frohlich, N., Oppenheimer, J., & Kurki, A. (2004). Modeling other-regarding preferences and an experimental test. Public Choice, 119<\/em>, 91-117.<\/p>\n\n\n\n[4] Cappelen, A. W., Hole, A. D., S\u00f8rensen, E. \u00d8., & Tungodden, B. (2007). The pluralism of fairness ideals: An experimental approach. American Economic Review, 97(3)<\/em>, 818-827.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Last month, Science published an research article by Joe Henrich et al. showing that market integration and participation in world religion covary with fairness (‘Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness and Punishment’). The team had people from various societies play experimental economic games in which a sum of money given by the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":680,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[27],"tags":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Are variations in economic games really caused by culture? - International Cognition and Culture Institute<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n