<\/a>While the self is comprised of a long list of mental and physical features, the true self is primarily moral. Moral features contribute to perceived identity more than any other personal feature [1,2]. Moral traits are also considered to be the most deeply rooted, causally central aspect of a person\u2019s identity [3]. This pattern is quite robust. It shows up regardless of the context (changes brought on the aging process, medical interventions, supernatural events), and regardless of the type of moral feature (disposition, behavior, or belief); [4,5]). \nThe true self is not merely moral, but morally good. When asked which part of the self is responsible for a person becoming bad (e.g. a deadbeat dad), subjects attribute this change to the surface self, but becoming a better person (e.g. a loving father) is attributed to the true self [6]. This effect is contingent on the values of the person rendering the judgment: liberals think homosexual urges are part of the true self, but conservatives think it is not. Though we are perfectly willing to conceive of people as bad, we are unwilling to see them as bad deep down.<\/p>\nOne of the more fervent research programs of social psychology has focused on actor-observer asymmetries. Yet the true self appears to be perspective invariant. People judge that their own true selves are morally good, but they also judge that other people\u2019s true selves are morally good.<\/p>\n
A long tradition of research uncovers dramatic differences in conceptions of the self across cultures. Nonetheless, preliminary investigations find that the true self is seen as morally good across a variety of cultures. This finding shows up even amongst the notoriously misanthropic Russians and Tibetan Buddhists, who expressly disavow the existence of the self [7,8].<\/p>\n
One possible explanation for these findings is that true self attributions arise as a result of more domain-general cognitive processes. In support of this view, recent work finds that a wide range of non-human entities are also seen as essentially good [9,10]. Recent studies show that beliefs about the true self are characterized by telltale features of essentialist reasoning, such as immutability, informativeness, and inherence [11]. The features attributed to the true self might therefore be due to the influence of psychological essentialism.<\/p>\n
\nReferences<\/strong><\/p>\n[1] Strohminger, N. and Nichols, S. (2014). The Essential Moral Self. Cognition, 1(31),<\/em> 159\u2013171. \n[2] Strohminger, N. and Nichols, N. (2015). Neurodegeneration and Identity. Psychological Science, 26(9)<\/em>, 1468\u20131479. \n[3] Chen, S., Urminsky, O. and Bartels, D. (2016). Beliefs about the Causal Structure of the Self-Concept Determine Which Changes Disrupt Personal Identity. Psychological Science, Vol. 27(10)<\/em>, 1398\u20131406. \n[4] Heiphetz, L., Strohminger, N., and Young, L. (in press). The Role of Moral Beliefs, Memories, and Preferences in Representations of Identity. Cognitive Science<\/em>. \n[5] Molouki, S. and Bartels, D. M. (in press). Personal change and the continuity of identity. Cognitive Psychology<\/em>. \n[6] Newman, G., Bloom, P. and Knobe, J. (2014). Value Judgments and the True Self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40,<\/em> 203-216. \n[7] Garfield, J. L., Nichols, S., Rai, A. K., and Strohminger, N. (2015). Ego, egoism and the impact of religion on ethical experience: What a paradoxical consequence of buddhist culture tells us about moral psychology. The Journal of Ethics, 19(3-4)<\/em>, 293\u2013304. \n[8] De Freitas, J., Sarkissian, H., Grossman, I., De Brigard, F., Luco, A., Newman, G., & Knobe, J. (in prep). Is there universal belief in a good true self? \n[9] Knobe, J., Prasada, S., and Newman, G. (2013). Dual character concepts and the normative dimension of conceptual representation. Cognition,\u00a0127<\/em>, 242-257. \n[10] De Freitas, J., Tobia, K., Newman, G., and Knobe, J. (in press). The good ship Theseus: The effect of valence on object identity judgments. Cognitive Science<\/em>. \n[11] Christy, A., Schlegel, R., and Cimpian, A. (in prep). Why do people believe in true selves? The role of psychological essentialism.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"Some recent work in experimental philosophy and in social psychology addresses central issues in cognition and culture. Case in point: an \u00a0article by Nina Strohminger, George Newman, and Joshua Knobe entitled “The True Self: A psychological concept distinct from the self” (forthcoming in Perspectives on Psychological Science\u00a0and\u00a0available here.) We thought discussing both the substance of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1633,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[268],"tags":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Pr\u00e9cis of "The True Self: A psychological concept distinct from the self" - International Cognition and Culture Institute<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n