{"id":15272,"date":"2021-10-01T09:34:13","date_gmt":"2021-10-01T07:34:13","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/?p=15272"},"modified":"2023-07-24T15:06:02","modified_gmt":"2023-07-24T13:06:02","slug":"why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/hugo-mercier\/why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong\/","title":{"rendered":"Why assholes are more likely to be wrong"},"content":{"rendered":"

Sometimes, we form beliefs that we anticipate others will disagree with\u2014from thinking a movie our friends unanimously loved was terrible, to developing a new scientific theory that upsets the current paradigm. Typically, our audience\u2019s first reaction will be to think we\u2019re dead wrong. They might even be offended. And maybe they\u2019re right! In which case, not only did we risk offending friends or colleagues, we also look silly. Is it better to say nothing, then? But what if we are<\/em> right? We might be depriving others of a great idea, or fail to correct a grave misconception, and pass on a chance to improve our status by doing so (see, e.g., Altay et al., 2020).<\/p>\n

Arguably, there are two main factors that decide\u2014in a given context\u2014whether or not to speak out when we hold a belief we anticipate will be controversial.<\/p>\n

First, there\u2019s confidence. If we\u2019re really sure we\u2019re right, we should be more likely to challenge the status quo: being confident means we (think we) have fewer chances of looking stupid by spouting some inept idea, and more chances of reaping reputational rewards for our valuable insight. If you\u2019re more confident, you\u2019re more likely to speak up, in particular if the idea appears controversial.<\/p>\n

Fortunately, in some contexts at least, there\u2019s a reasonably strong correlation between confidence and accuracy (e.g., Bahrami et al., 2010; Koriat, 2008). This suggests that, on the whole, people who are more likely to be right are more likely to speak up.<\/p>\n

The second factor is agreeableness (or lack thereof). There are people who are more careful about not rocking the boat, not offending anyone\u2014people who want to be perceived as nice, people who want to \u201cget along\u201d instead of \u201cstanding out\u201d (Ybarra et al., 2001). In personality psychology, this corresponds to people high in agreeableness, or in communion. Studies have shown that agreeableness is related to conformity, with agreeable people less likely to challenge a consensual opinion (DeYoung et al., 2002; Roccas et al., 2002).<\/p>\n

At the end of the (dis)agreeableness scale, we find assholes. Philosopher Aaron James, who wrote the book on the topic, defines the asshole as someone who \u201callows himself to enjoy special advantages in social relations out of an entrenched sense of entitlement that immunizes him against the complaints of other people\u201d (James, 2014). This definition\u2014and common sense\u2014suggest that assholes are particularly likely to say things that others will disagree with, regardless of the social consequences. The present argument applies quite continuously on the agreeableness scale, but targeting assholes is more fun.<\/p>\n

Taking stock, we can depict what we have so far in the following graph:<\/p>\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n

Each cross is a controversial thought in someone\u2019s mind. There\u2019s no reason to expect less agreeable people to be less likely to form accurate thoughts\u2014they\u2019re assholes, not idiots. That\u2019s why there\u2019s no correlation between the two dimensions. In particular, assholes (people on top of the graph) aren\u2019t more likely to form ideas that are right or wrong than nice guys (at the bottom).<\/p>\n

Everything changes when people decide whether to speak up. As argued above, this decision is a factor of both agreeableness (the y-axis) and odds of being right (or confidence) (the x-axis). If the combination of these two factors is above a given threshold (the red line), then people venture the controversial opinion. We thus end up with the following graph:<\/p>\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n

Here, everything that is below the red line doesn\u2019t get said: there are ideas that might be right, but are held by very nice and shy people (bottom middle), the ideas of people who don\u2019t care so much about what others think, but that are held with too little confidence (left middle), and the idea held with little confidence by shy people (those least likely to be voiced, bottom left).<\/p>\n

If we focus on the thoughts above the red line, those that get said, a negative correlation emerges (red dotted line):<\/p>\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n

This is the well-known Berkson paradox (which I belatedly discovered).<\/p>\n

What this means is that, if we only look at what people say (not what they think), when venturing a controversial opinion, the more disagreeable someone is, the more likely they are to be wrong.<\/p>\n

Assholes are more likely to be wrong.<\/p>\n

This is quite intuitive: take a controversial idea held with little confidence, and thus likely to be wrong. Someone who\u2019s very nice would never think of uttering it. By contrast, an asshole would have no such qualm. Consider now an idea held very confidently (and thus more likely to be right): both the nice guy and the asshole will share it. As a result, when a controversial idea is uttered by someone who doesn\u2019t like rocking the boat, it\u2019s a good sign that the idea is good. If the guy\u2019s an asshole, and doesn\u2019t have any filter, then we can\u2019t tell how good the idea is.<\/p>\n

Many people must have already thought of that, but to my great embarrassment, I don\u2019t know who, so if that rings any bells, please let me know!<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n


\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Altay, S., Majima, Y., & Mercier, H. (2020). It\u2019s my idea! Reputation management and idea appropriation. Evolution and Human Behavior<\/em>.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Bahrami, B., Olsen, K., Latham, P. E., Roepstorff, A., Rees, G., & Frith, C. D. (2010). Optimally interacting minds. Science<\/em>, 329<\/em>(5995), 1081\u20131085.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

DeYoung, C. G., Peterson, J. B., & Higgins, D. M. (2002). Higher-order factors of the Big Five predict conformity: Are there neuroses of health? Personality and Individual Differences<\/em>, 33<\/em>(4), 533\u2013552.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

James, A. (2014). Assholes: A theory<\/em>. Anchor.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Koriat, A. (2008). Subjective confidence in one\u2019s answers: The consensuality principle. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition<\/em>, 34<\/em>(4), 945\u2013959.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., & Knafo, A. (2002). The big five personality factors and personal values. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin<\/em>, 28<\/em>(6), 789\u2013801.<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Ybarra, O., Chan, E., & Park, D. (2001). Young and old adults\u2019 concerns about morality and competence. Motivation and Emotion<\/em>, 25<\/em>(2), 85\u2013100.<\/p>\n

<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Sometimes, we form beliefs that we anticipate others will disagree with\u2014from thinking a movie our friends unanimously loved was terrible, to developing a new scientific theory that upsets the current paradigm. Typically, our audience\u2019s first reaction will be to think we\u2019re dead wrong. They might even be offended. And maybe they\u2019re right! In which case, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":693,"featured_media":15274,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6],"tags":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nWhy assholes are more likely to be wrong - International Cognition and Culture Institute<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/hugo-mercier\/why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Why assholes are more likely to be wrong\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Sometimes, we form beliefs that we anticipate others will disagree with\u2014from thinking a movie our friends unanimously loved was terrible, to developing a new scientific theory that upsets the current paradigm.\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/hugo-mercier\/why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"International Cognition and Culture Institute\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2021-10-01T07:34:13+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2023-07-24T13:06:02+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/wp-content\/uploads\/image-4.png\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"896\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"506\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:title\" content=\"Why assholes are more likely to be wrong\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:description\" content=\"Sometimes, we form beliefs that we anticipate others will disagree with\u2014from thinking a movie our friends unanimously loved was terrible, to developing a new scientific theory that upsets the current paradigm.\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:image\" content=\"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/wp-content\/uploads\/image-4.png\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\">\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Hugo Mercier\">\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Estimated reading time\">\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"4 minutes\">\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/\",\"name\":\"International Cognition and Culture Institute\",\"description\":\"\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":\"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/?s={search_term_string}\",\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/hugo-mercier\/why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong\/#primaryimage\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-GB\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/wp-content\/uploads\/image-4.png\",\"width\":896,\"height\":506,\"caption\":\"Being right\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/hugo-mercier\/why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong\/#webpage\",\"url\":\"http:\/\/cognitionandculture.local\/blogs\/hugo-mercier\/why-assholes-are-more-likely-to-be-wrong\/\",\"name\":\"Why assholes are more likely to be wrong - 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