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<\/figure><\/div>\n\n\nThe diffusion of discursive strategies regarded as successful with the public is a well-documented phenomenon among social elites \u2013 from celebrities and media personalities to politicians (Campbell and Manning 2018; Littler 2008; Renninger 2018). This trend has only been amplified with the rise of social media and the so-called \u2018call-out culture,\u2019 which entails swift reputational sanctions for public figures voicing opinions or engaging in practices seen as unethical or problematic by their target audiences (Gerrie 2019). Russia\u2019s recent conservative turn under President Putin has led to the powerful proliferation of patriotic and nationalistic discourses among pro-regime cultural elites and state officials alike. Yet, unlike abstract references to \u201cnational greatness,\u201d the communication strategy that centers on respect and concern for the well-being of average citizens has received considerably less traction among Russian state officials \u2013 a curious trend that I believe requires further explication. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
At first sight, the logic or strategy behind Vladimir Putin\u2019s interactions with the public does not seem particularly hard to understand or costly to imitate: display compassion when tragedy strikes, offer symbolic recognition to members of the public by listening to their concerns, and make vague promises of a better future. Rinse, repeat. The failure of so many state officials to follow this simple model has baffled many Russian political commentators whose attempts to explain this phenomenon range from questioning bureaucrats\u2019 IQs and allegations that ruling elites don\u2019t care about their image because they are often appointed, not elected, to suggestions that PR failures are deliberately staged to distract the public. However, none of these explanations feel fully satisfactory to me, even though I do acknowledge the partial relevance of the first two theories. Instead, I propose an alternative interpretation that draws attention to the structural position of specific actors and that I believe has broader implications for thinking about diffusion of different political styles and negotiation of the discourse of grievance in contexts where assignment of blame is limited.<\/p>\n\n\n
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<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n\u201cNo more than 3,000 [rubles] per month. Macaroni price is always the same.\u201d <\/strong> While the withdrawal of state support from multiple sectors of the Russian economy has been a de facto policy for the past 30 years, President Putin has never blanketly endorsed neoliberalism and instead goes to great lengths to portray himself as a caring, compassionate leader. To protect his approval ratings, Putin often distances himself from unpopular social policies and blames their disastrous outcomes on the corruption and incompetence of regional heads and mid-level state officials \u2013 a political strategy popularly known as \u201cGood Tsar, Bad Boyars.\u201d This strategy does not mean, however, that the President\u2019s government benefits from controversial statements by officials that generate resentment and further exacerbate existing social tensions. The forced resignation of disgraced officials and recently proposed amendments to the \u201cinsulting speech\u201d law that envision fines for state representatives who offend citizens speak to efforts to curtail the embarrassing incidents.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While such sanctions might push some state officials to avoid direct insults, I predict that they will have little impact on their overall communicative strategies because the structural position of officials as \u201cbad boyars\u201d virtually precludes them from successfully imitating the president\u2019s rhetorical style. Popularly blamed for most social problems, when asked to comment on them, mid-level state officials hardly see it as an opportunity for self-promotion via public displays of compassion. Instead, they feel attacked and choose to go on the defensive by invoking the neoliberal discourses of \u201cindividual responsibility\u201d as a justification for existing problems. Pensioners, teachers, and doctors are struggling to put food on the table? They should have chosen more lucrative professions! State inspectors failed to shut down a summer camp that routinely sent children on unsafe canoe trips? Perhaps the children themselves should have known better than to \u201cgo for a swim.\u201d Although they often fail to predict the public\u2019s reaction to their statements, these officials clearly do care about their public image. In fact, their provocative statements can be seen as an attempt to defend it by shifting blame from the institutions they represent, but do not fully control, to individual citizens. As they fear the wrath of their superiors significantly more than the Russian public, officials cannot point fingers back at the inadequate funding or oversight by the federal government. Nor can they acknowledge the validity of average people\u2019s grievances, as in this context it would be tantamount to an admission of personal guilt.<\/p>\n\n\n \u201cSo, how did your job go?\u201d. A meme created following Astakhov\u2019s forced resignation that reverses the roles and has the survivors ask the former Children\u2019s Rights Commissioner. Source: pikabu.ru.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n A similar analysis can be applied to the patterns of diffusion of populist discourses that enable political actors to make a claim of representing \u201cthe people\u201d by channelling popular discontent and scorning elites. Many political commentators have long held that the major danger of \u201cfringe populist movements\u201d lies in their capacity to influence mainstream political discourse, as established parties adopt parts of their agendas to avoid losing voters (Camu 2011; Curran 2004; Mazzoleni 2008; Van Spanje 2010). Yet, the diffusion of populist tropes has not been as widespread as predicted. While clearly successful with aggrieved constituencies, it is difficult for political actors who have been part of the establishment for decades to faithfully employ this rhetorical strategy. As a result, their options for responding to populist challenges are rather limited: they can either attempt to defend the status quo and refuse to acknowledge the often legitimate grievances underlying populist agendas (as was the case with Hillary Clinton\u2019s infamous \u201cbasket of deplorables\u201d comment and her declaration that \u201cAmerica is already great\u201d) or they can try to adopt modified versions of populist discourses that acknowledge social problems, but place blame on \u201cexternal\u201d forces \u2013 transnational governing bodies (EU, UN, OECD, etc.), foreign governments, or groups perceived to act on behalf of these forces (dissident intellectuals, NGOs, immigrants, infiltrators, etc.). Contrary to the persistent stereotype of politicians as incorrigible demagogues or opportunists eager to say whatever will please their voters, in reality, the structural position of long-term officeholders in precarious economies substantially limits their capacity to engage with critical discourses. From this perspective, the PR failures of Russian politicians and leaders in many other countries often ascribed to an individual inability to absorb changing cultural norms or understand public expectations, may in fact reflect the strategic choice to stick to tropes that exculpate the interest groups they represent.<\/p>\n\n\n References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Atkisson, Curtis, Michael J. O\u2019Brien, and Alex Mesoudi. 2012. \u201cAdult Learners in a Novel Environment Use Prestige-Biased Social Learning.\u201d Evolutionary Psychology <\/em>10(3): 519-37.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Campbell, Bradley and Jason Manning. 2018. The Rise of Victimhood Culture. Microaggressions, Safe Spaces, and the New Culture Wars<\/em>. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Camus, Jean-Yves. 2011. \u201cThe Extreme Right in France: Redrawing the Map to Be Expected.\u201d Pp. 83-99 in Is Europe on the \u2018Right\u2019 Path? Right-Wing Extremism and Right-Wing Populism in Europe<\/em> edited by N. Langenberger and B. Schellenberg. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Curran, Giorel. 2004. \u201cMainstreaming Populist Discourse: The Race-Conscious Legacy of Neo-Populist Parties in Australia and Italy.\u201d Patterns of Prejudice<\/em> 38(1): 37-55.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Henrich, Joseph and Francisco J. Gil-White. 2001. \u201cThe Evolution of Prestige: Freely Conferred Deference as a Mechanism for Enhancing the Benefits of Cultural Transmission.\u201d Evolution and Human Behavior<\/em> 22(3): 165-196.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Henrich, Joseph. 2015. The Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter<\/em>. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Littler, Jo. 2008. \u201c\u201cI Feel Your Pain\u201d: Cosmopolitan Charity and the Public Fashioning of the Celebrity Soul.\u201d Social Semiotics<\/em> 18(2): 237-251.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Mazzoleni, Gianpietro. 2008. \u201cPopulism and the Media.\u201d Pp. 49-66 in Twenty-First Century Populism: The Spectre of Western European Democracy<\/em> edited by D. Albertazzi and D. McDonnell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Renninger, Bryce. 2018. \u201c\u201cARE YOU A FEMINIST ?\u201d Celebrity, Publicity, and the Making of a PR-Friendly Feminism. Emergent Feminisms.\u201d Pp. 42-56 in Complicating a Postfeminist Media Culture<\/em> edited by J. Keller and M. E. Ryan. New York: Routledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Van Spanje, Joost. 2010. \u201cContagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties\u2019 Stances on Immigration in Contemporary Western Europe. Party Politics<\/em> 16(5): 563\u2013586.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In 2018, during a public meeting, Olga Glatskikh, head of the Sverdlovsk Region Youth Politics Department, gave the following response to a question about the lack of state funding for youth projects: \u201cThe state owes nothing to you in principle. Your parents who gave birth to you owe you things. The state did not ask […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1398,"featured_media":14090,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[288],"tags":[],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
A meme featuring Natalia Sokolova.<\/strong> Source: yaplakal.com<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<\/a><\/figure><\/div>\n\n\n
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\n\n\n\n[1] \u201cRussian youth politics official suspended for saying state \u2018didn\u2019t ask\u2019 people to have kids.\u201d Russia Today<\/em>, November 6, 2018.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n[2] \u201cLeft MP loses 2kg after week on living wage, after sinking millionaire minister who set it.\u201d Russia Today<\/em>, November 1, 2018.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n[3] \u201cDon’t Teach if You Want to Make Money, Says Medvedev.\u201d The Moscow Times<\/em>, August 4, 2016.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n[4] \u201cRussian Ombudsman Asks Boating Tragedy’s Child Survivors: ‘So How Was The Swim?\u201d Radio Free Europe<\/em>, June 24, 2016.<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"