Week 9 – The Reproduction of Technology

This early draft was authored by Dietrich Stout.

What is Technology?

 Neuroscientific and psychological research commonly treats tool-use as an obvious behavioral category that does not require explicit delineation (e.g. Gönül, Takmaz, Hohenberger, & Corballis, 2018; Heald, Ingram, Flanagan, & Wolpert, 2018; Orban & Caruana, 2014). This is a misapprehension, as illustrated by extensive (and inconclusive) ethological attempts to define tool-use for comparative purposes (Crain, Giray, & Abramson, 2013; Fragaszy & Mangalam, 2018). For example, Osiurak and colleagues (Osiurak & Heinke, 2018; Osiurak & Reynaud, 2019; Reynaud, Lesourd, Navarro, & Osiurak, 2016) have argued that the prevailing cognitive science conception of tool-use as object manipulation is too narrow because it excludes “tools” such as machines, computers, containers, and structures and fails to emphasize a uniquely human capacity for “technical reasoning.” Osiurak et al. propose neologisms like intoolligence (Osiurak & Heinke, 2018) to describe this broader sphere of investigation but the existing term technology might prove more apt if its meaning can be suitably constrained.

Technology has been defined as everything from a physical assemblage of hardware to a set of rules or methods for problem solving (Dusek, 2006).  Language and number systems have been described as “cognitive technologies” (e.g. Frank, Everett, Fedorenko, & Gibson, 2008), B.F. Skinner (Skinner, 2002) envisioned a “technology of behavior,” and Michel Foucault (Foucault, 1988) enumerated technologies of production, sign systems, social control, and “the self.” Potential meanings of technology thus range from the smartphone in your pocket to essentially all of human culture and cognition. It may be helpful to ground this concept with comparative and evolutionary perspectives on technology as a distinctly human domain of activity that has helped to shape the modern human brain and mind. This “technological niche” perspective converges usefully with the “technological systems” approach developed in the social sciences, which identifies a technology as an integrated system of hardware, people, skills, knowledge, social relations, and institutions applied to practical tasks (Dusek, 2006; Hughes, 1987). The technological niche perspective enhances this definition by providing an evolutionarily motived interpretation of “practical.” 

The Human Technological Niche

As Darwin (Darwin, 1871: 136) noted, humans are a highly successful species. Even without agriculture, it has been estimated that Homo sapiens would have attained a global population of more than 70 million and a total biomass greater than any other large vertebrate (Hill, Barton, & Hurtado, 2009). This paradoxical demographic potential in a large-brained primate with notoriously costly young (Miller, Churchill, & Nunn, 2019) is enabled by a human strategy of alloparenting (Burkart, van Schaik, & Griesser, 2017) or biocultural reproduction (Bogin, Bragg, & Kuzawa, 2014), in which individuals other than the parents donate resources (e.g., time, effort, food) to help support offspring. For alloparents to have resources available for contribution, at least some individuals must reliably produce a surplus beyond what they require for survival. Embodied capital theory (Kaplan, Gurven, Winking, Hooper, & Stieglitz, 2010) thus proposes that humans have evolved a tightly integrated strategy in which a focus on high-value, difficult-to-acquire food resources provides the surplus nutrition needed to fund growth, survival, and reproduction, and is in turn enabled by the increased longevity and brain size that allow teaching, learning, and the cultural evolution of increasingly effective skills, knowledge, and equipment. This human-constructed niche (Laland et al., 2015) is thereby populated by increasingly complex technological systems focused on evolutionarily practical tasks of material production.

Such an evolutionary framing of technology specifies a behavioral domain of socially reproduced and elaborated activities typically involving the manipulation and modification of objects to enact changes in the physical environment (Stout, 2013). This extends well beyond conventional conceptions of tool use to include much longer causal chains (e.g. use of a tool to construct a mechanism to harvest a resource to make a product, and so on) (Stout, 2013), involving the coordinated activity of many individuals (Powers, van Schaik, & Lehmann, 2016), and the use of objects and materials in a wide range of roles other than as hand-held instruments (Osiurak & Heinke, 2018). It also encompasses processes of social reproduction that enable the accumulation of technological complexity (Stout & Hecht, 2017). At the same time, a focus on material production restricts the concept of technology from spreading to encompass all of human culture.

Technology is not, however, limited to activities that directly increase net energy capture or survival rates (cf. Isler & Van Schaik, 2014; White, 1943) since the nature of production and the currency of returns to individuals can vary so widely across economic and cultural systems. A more robust distinction can be made between materially instrumental tasks primarily intended to achieve physical changes in the world and communicative tasks that seek to alter the thoughts, behaviors, and/or experiences of the self or others (cf. Legare & Nielsen, 2015). Human culture clearly encompasses both, but technology as defined here includes only the former. This distinction is important for cognitive science because instrumental and communicative goals present very different functional demands and design constraints and will thus tend to implicate different cognitive processes (Finkel, Hogrefe, Frey, Goldenberg, & Randerath, 2018; Tylén, Philipsen, Roepstorff, & Fusaroli, 2016), social learning mechanisms (Legare & Nielsen, 2015), and cultural evolutionary dynamics (Derex & Mesoudi, 2020; Rogers & Ehrlich, 2008). By more rigorously defining the object of study, the technological niche concept provides the unifying framework for a cognitive science of human technology.

Cognitive Foundations of Technology

Attempts to specify a critical “essence” of technology have invoked everything from skilled prehension (Buxbaum, 2017; Fragaszy & Mangalam, 2018; Heald et al., 2018; Yildirim, Wu, Kanwisher, & Tenenbaum, 2019), to causal reasoning (Osiurak & Reynaud, 2019; Wolpert, 2003), mental time travel (Suddendorf, Bulley, & Miloyan, 2018), imitation (Derex, Bonnefon, Boyd, & Mesoudi, 2019; Legare & Nielsen, 2015), and mentalizing (Tomasello, Kruger, & Ratner, 1993). Rather than prioritizing one of these, a technological niche perspective recognizes all as relevant and provides a framework for considering their interaction. For example, the remarkable complexity and efficacy of human technology is often attributed to a process of incremental improvement over time referred to as cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) (Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018). CCE is widely held to rely upon “high fidelity” social reproduction mechanisms requiring mentalizing and/or imitation in order to enable the lossless accumulation of innovations over time (Dean, Kendal, Schapiro, Thierry, & Laland, 2012; Derex et al., 2019; Tomasello et al., 1993). In the case of technology, however, capacities for causal and analogical reasoning (Gentner & Hoyos, 2017; Osiurak & Reynaud, 2019), cognitive control (Gönül et al., 2018; McDougle, Ivry, & Taylor, 2016; Stout, Hecht, Khreisheh, Bradley, & Chaminade, 2015), memory (Gruber & Ranganath, 2019), and perceptual-motor control (Sánchez et al., 2017) will often be implicated in the behavioral exploration necessary for the generation and identification of beneficial innovations (Legare & Nielsen, 2015; Miu, Gulley, Laland, & Rendell, 2020). Many technologies will also require substantial learning as a foundation for such exploration and discernment, so that processes of knowledge reproduction (Gentner & Hoyos, 2017; Pan et al., 2020), skill acquisition (Gowlland, 2019), and innovation (Legare & Nielsen, 2015) are thoroughly intertwined (Osiurak & Reynaud, 2019; Stout & Hecht, 2017). Finally, the same capacities for intersubjectivity (Tomasello et al., 1993) and interactive alignment (Pagnotta, Laland, & Coco, 2020; Pan et al., 2020) that support the social reproduction of technology also underpin the cooperation and coordination (Hill et al., 2009; Powers et al., 2016) that have allowed the complexity of human technology to so far exceed that of individual animal tool-use.

Technological Reproduction

Although social learning is commonly treated as the “transmission” or “copying” of information (e.g. Boyd, Richerson, & Henrich, 2011), technological learning is a protracted, collaborative process (Gobet, 2015; Gowlland, 2019; Pargeter, Khreisheh, & Stout, 2019; Suddendorf, Brinums, & Imuta, 2016) better described as the reproduction of skill. This reflects demands for the precise control of physical contingencies in pursuit of complex technological goals, and has important implications for understanding the processes of high-fidelity imitation and innovation that have been termed the twin “engines” of cumulative cultural evolution (CCE) (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). In particular, the complexity of real-world technological reproduction problematizes dichotomies of social vs. asocial learning (Heyes, 2018), product vs. process copying (Tennie, Call, & Tomasello, 2009), and “blind” vs. guided innovation (Mesoudi, in press) that have been prevalent in experimental and modeling approaches to CCE. This is exemplified in technological apprenticeship (Gowlland, 2019; Sterelny, 2012) which alternates social learning with individual practice (Stout, 2013) in an iterative process of increasing refinement that Whiten (Whiten, 2015) refers to as a “helical curriculum.” Social information ranging from exemplar artifacts, tools, and observable behavior available in a constructed “learning niche” (Flynn, Laland, Kendal, & Kendal, 2013; Stout & Hecht, 2017) to intentional demonstration, explicit instruction, and affective feedback from teachers (Kline, 2015) guides learners to re-create increasingly sophisticated skills though deliberate practice over extended periods, with each round of individual practice allowing deeper appreciation of the available social information (Stout, 2013; Stout & Hecht, 2017; Whiten, 2015).

The end result is technological expertise that combines refined internal models for efficient action perception, control, and prediction (McNamee & Wolpert, 2019; Sokolov, Miall, & Ivry, 2017) with flexible task-related knowledge structures assembled in hierarchical systems of increasing depth and complexity (Gobet, 2015; Stout, 2013). The absolute and relative importance of these different elements are expected to vary across technologies ranging from stone tool making [Box 3] to engineering (Purzer, Moore, & Dringenberg, 2018) or computer programming (Blackwell, Petre, & Church, 2019), and will help determine the relevance and efficacy of strategies such as trial-and-error experimentation (Truskanov & Prat, 2018), end-product emulation (Reindl, Apperly, Beck, & Tennie, 2017), body movement mimicry (Heyes, 2018; Tennie et al., 2009), intention sharing (Tomasello et al., 1993), and various forms of social scaffolding and teaching (Kline, 2015). For example, demanding perceptual-motor skills require deliberate practice over extended periods, often in the absence of apparent progress or immediate rewards (Gray & Lindstedt, 2017; Pargeter et al., 2019). For learners, this requires the prospective ability to imagine payoffs of investment in one’s future self (Suddendorf et al., 2016; Suddendorf et al., 2018). For teachers, it places a premium on mentalizing and metacognitive strategies for motivation and encouragement, including intervention to help learners manage (e.g. “you’re getting impatient, take a break”) or reappraise (e.g. “think of it as an opportunity”) their own affective and mental states (Buhle et al., 2013). Rather than one key reproductive mechanism enabling the buildup of cumulative technology (cf. Osiurak & Reynaud, 2019; Tennie et al., 2009), we should expect context-dependent diversity (Caldwell, 2020).

Similarly, a focus on technological reproduction helps to resolve the false dichotomy between directed exploration and blind variation and selection as drivers of technological innovation (Derex et al., 2019; Mesoudi, in press; Osiurak & Reynaud, 2019) by drawing attention to the requirements for individual skill that underpin both. Thus, even the strongest examples of blind evolution (e.g. the gradual optimization of 10th – 18th century violin sound holes absent any understanding of acoustic engineering principles (Nia et al., 2015)) require reproductive accuracy and discernment of desired outcomes by expert craftspeople with detailed understanding of their tools, materials, and products. Acquired skills and knowledge are expected to constrain and guide variation (e.g. Derex et al., 2019) by biasing the likelihood of copying and adoption (Boyd et al., 2011; Henrich, 2016; Kendal et al., 2018), the direction and probability of copy errors (Truskanov & Prat, 2018) and the generation of innovations both through intentional trail-and-error and by insight (Legare & Nielsen, 2015). Furthermore, cultural norms and practices for skill reproduction can influence both rates of random variation and tendencies toward intentional innovation (Lew-Levy, Milks, Lavi, Pope, & Friesem, 2020). Much as in biological evolution (Laland et al., 2015), a technological niche perspective does not always allow a clean analytical separation between proximate cognitive and behavioral mechanisms and ultimate population-level processes of change.

To be added: Paleolithic stone-tool making as a case study.

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7 Comments

  • comment-avatar
    Dan Sperber 21 November 2020 (15:49)

    Compromises between instrumental and communicative tasks?Thanks to Dietrich Stout for this very rich and precise way of highlighting the conceptual resources available to address main challenges in the evolutionary, anthropological, and cognitive study of technology. Dietrich writes:

    “A more robust distinction can be made between materially instrumental tasks primarily intended to achieve physical changes in the world and communicative tasks that seek to alter the thoughts, behaviors, and/or experiences of the self or others (cf. Legare & Nielsen, 2015). Human culture clearly encompasses both, but technology as defined here includes only the former. This distinction is important for cognitive science because instrumental and communicative goals present very different functional demands and design constraints”

    This distinction is particularly relevant for our common purpose of considering under which conditions the use of techniques on the one hand and their transmission on the other hand may call for rigidity or for flexibility and how this possibly conflicting demands interact.

    The use of specific techniques may be individual or collaborative and, in the second case, it may involve communicative sub-tasks. Transmission of techniques on the other hand is quite commonly a basically communicative task and different so for teacher and for learner. In the common case where the teacher does more than letting the learner observe the process but actually demonstrates it, this involves for the teacher producing some departures from the process itself such as slowing-downs, exaggerated movements, comments, and so on with may vary according to the learning capacity and involvement of the learner. Efficient teaching typically involves pedagogic flexibility which calls for some variability in the way the technical task is performed.

    Leaners presented with a pedagogical demonstration must not rigidly imitate it since it would mean copying demonstrative modifications that are not part of the technique as it should be performed to achieve its material goal. Some cognitive flexibility may well be required on the part of the learner to separate what is to be copied from what the teacher produces just to make the copying easier.

    Given the different demands of using a technique, teaching it, and learning it, an evolutionary question arises: may these different demands favour compromises where, for instance, a technique evolves in a way that is practically sub-optimal but easier to transmit, or, on the contrary, are there cases where the practical demands of a technique are so rigid as to impose cost in the process of transmission high enough to jeopardize the wide or enduring propagation of the technique itself?

  • comment-avatar
    Dietrich Stout 23 November 2020 (19:48)

    Communication, collaboration, transmission
    Thank you Dan, I very much agree. Your final comment regarding effects of transmission costs on technical propagation makes me think of interesting work from Valentine (e.g. Roux 1990. The psychological analysis of technical activities: a contribution to the study of craft specialization. Archaeological Review from Cambridge 9 (1), 142-153) on the adoption of wheel-thrown vs. hand-built pottery and how this is influenced by the interaction between transmission costs (both skill learning and material) and economic context (e.g. craft specialization and market vs. domestic production). I’ve similarly suggested in some recent papers that Behavioral Ecology approaches to lithic technology have often neglected learning costs in trying to understand technological choices and patterns of adoption. It is also true that a broader “technological niche” concept necessarily involves both collaboration and communication for reproduction, including “intentional demonstration, explicit instruction, and affective feedback” etc. An idea I am interested in further exploring is the shared foundation of both individual and social learning in mechanism of body awareness and predictive processing insofar as the coordination of action between individuals relies on reciprocal prediction achieved by interpersonal coupling of internal forward models for anticipatory motor control. Such “brain-to-brain coupling” can occur at multiple levels of abstraction and may provide a key mechanism supporting implicit mentalizing, empathy, communication, learning, and social affiliation. These are in turn critical to supporting technological collaboration at larger group and institutional scales as well as social reproduction of technology.

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    Adam Boyette 24 November 2020 (15:41)

    Niche construction and motivation to learn
    Dietrich, Thanks for this excellent delineation of the technological niche. Not surprisingly, I think our perspectives and contributions to this project are very compatible. For example, I appreciate the perspective that, “technological learning is a protracted, collaborative process… better described as the reproduction of skill.” This is also how I have approached and problematized the idea of “transmission” in my own work on children’s cultural learning (though I haven’t focused on technology before).

    Along those lines, I want to pose one related question stemming from how I thought about learning techniques in my draft chapter (which I am not entirely sure is consistent with others’ uses here – so I am enjoying learning more from the other contributors):

    You note that, “demanding perceptual-motor skills require deliberate practice over extended periods, often in the absence of apparent progress or immediate rewards… For learners, this requires the prospective ability to imagine payoffs of investment in one’s future self…”

    I see what you’re saying, but I wonder if you would agree that, at least in small-scale human societies, the social and often public nature of human technological manufacture would help demonstrate the payoffs to novices and actually help generate motivation to learn despite lack of immediate rewards in own skill, thus even lowering the learning curve and cognitive costs? Here, I’m thinking from a child’s perspective, who watches experts utilizing techniques and sees the benefits of them (in food or other resources produced) in their daily lives.

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    Helena Miton 30 November 2020 (03:18)

    Technical or technological?
    Thanks for this very stimulating contribution. You pointed out a number of limitations in the way cultural evolution approaches the technological niche which I have found frustrating without being able to pinpoint them nearly as clearly. This contribution provides a lot of great conceptual clarifications, but I’d like to ask for one more. Where do techniques fit in the picture? Are all techniques part of technological systems? What is their role in technology? If techniques exist both inside and outside of technological systems, what would be the most relevant insights from technological case studies that we could export to non-technological cases?

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    Dietrich Stout 4 December 2020 (19:20)

    Re: Motivation to learn
    Thanks Adam,

    I think you are precisely right about children seeing payoffs – this is the kind of thing I was thinking about. Part of the argument is that skill learning involves working toward these future payoffs in the absence of immediate return. This comes so naturally to us that it is easy to take for granted, but even if you see the payoffs it still involves imagining (in some way) a future self that can do these things and working toward it. One idea is that the mental simulation of accomplishment (visualizing the payoff) is actually rewarding in the present and helps to motivate practice. Again, this all comes naturally to us, but it is not clear if that is the case with other primates. But thinking again of the children you’ve observed – are they really motivated by material payoffs or some more abstract sense of identity and the social prestige of “acting like an adult”? Or by positive responses from adults and peers? When I think of my experience with children it seem like that might be the case. Resorting to an Kanzi anecdote, I was always told that when he was learning to flake stone he seemed more motivated by emotional reinforcement from Sue than he ever was by the reward in a puzzle box. Of course Kanzi (and kids I’ve been around) have such abundant food that maybe its not so motivating as it might be.

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    Dietrich Stout 4 December 2020 (19:45)

    Re: Technical vs. Technological
    Thanks Helena, great question. Technique is another word that could do with a more constrained definition, so let me see what I can come up with. There is again the problem of the broad sense of “techniques” for communication, thought, etc. but I suppose we can also restrict the sense here to materially instrumental techniques. These would be the skilled physical actions used to achieve goals. The “skilled” part of this would distinguish from goal-directed action generally, and implies an action that is used repeatedly in more or less the same way and refined over practice. In my thinking this would not necessarily be part of a technological system because it need not (though often would) be reproduced socially or involve collaboration between individuals. There is also a sense that a “technique” would generally be a more discrete action rather than an extended chain of actions and interactions, but it’s hard to say exactly where to cut the continuum. So I think you can have techniques that are not part of technological systems and probably this would be a good description of many instances of animal tool-use. It might also cover idiosyncratic practices of human individuals but we are so entangled with our material culture that most of our techniques are probably best seen as part of some technological system. In contrast to the techniques that comprise them, these systems involve much longer causal chains (e.g. use of a tool to construct a mechanism to harvest a resource to make a product, and so on), inculding the coordinated activity of many individuals, and the use of objects and materials in a wide range of roles other than as hand-held instruments.

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    Mathieu Charbonneau 9 December 2020 (14:55)

    The reproduction of skill
    Thank you Dietrich for your draft. I find the reframing of the question of technology in terms of reproduction quite stimulating. I particularly like the picture you draw against the simplistic, dichotomized one of guided exploration and blind variation + selection and replication, of Neo-Darwinian inspiration, and I very much like your framing of technological learning as the reproduction of skill—which to me suggests a broader, more Evo-Devo framing of technological evolution (Charbonneau 2017), e.g., adapting Leigh van Valen’s famous slogan (1973): technological evolution as the control of skill by ecology—where the ecology is cognitive, material, cultural, and social.

    (1) Let me play the devil’s advocate for a moment. The key advantage of building simplified models of replication, random error in transmission, and selection is it makes the study of long-term evolutionary patterns of technological stability and change manageable; your approach seems to be closer to the phenomena, but it is not clear to me how we can manage to deal with all these factors without loosing the tractability of simpler models and approaches. Experimental work can certainly gain from this approach; moving from building spaghetti towers and paper planes as stand-ins for all CCE technology to ecologically situated experiments (as Valentine and Blandine, on week 4). How do you think your approach could be implemented when examining longer-term evolutionary questions—technological evolution? Do we move away from modelling and theorizing inspired by Neo-Darwinian population-genetics, do we adapt those models, do we simply keep them as is, etc?

    (2) You also discuss a great deal about cognition and social cognition, and I would assume that when you’ll develop your case with Palaeolithic stone-tool making, the material dimension will also come in quite strongly. Reading you draft, I was wondering how to approach the institutional dimensions of technological reproduction, e.g., different norms in learning regimes (see Bert’s draft of week 13; Giulio’s on week 3; and Rita’s on week 10), and social dimension (e.g., social organization, as Nicola on week 2 discusses to some extent). But more centrally, the picture you present—if I understand correctly—is that the reproduction of technology is extremely context-dependent: who, when, with whom, what, where are key dimensions, and humans are particularly apt to exploit some cognitive processes in some way in some contexts and others and differently in other contexts (e.g., action coordination mechanisms, as in James, Arianna, and Luke’s week 1). Flexibility here concerns this capacity for adapting to circumstances and yet ensure the stable reproduction of skill. Do you have any general view as to how we come to solve these contextual problems?

    Charbonneau, Mathieu. “Evo-Devo and Culture.” In Evolutionary Developmental Biology – A Reference Guide, edited by Laura Nuño de la Rosa, Gerd Müller, and Sergio Balari Ravera. Springer, 2017.

    Van Valen, L. M. 1973a. Festschrift. Science 180:488.