Week 2 – Why do children lack flexibility when making tools? The role of social learning in innovation.

This early draft was authored by Nicola Cutting.

The capacity of humans to manufacture and use tools has evolved far beyond that seen in any other species (Boyd, Richerson & Henrich, 2011). This is thought to be due to our propensity for cumulative culture (Boyd & Richerson, 1996), where new techniques are copied throughout the social group and then improved upon in a ratchet-like effect (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello et al., 1993). Cumulative culture involves two factors – termed ‘dual engines’ (Legare & Nielsen, 2015) – innovation and imitation. The literature has predominantly focused on how humans copy others – social learning, with children demonstrating faithful replication of techniques from a young age. Only in the last decade have researchers investigated novel inventions, or innovations. In contrast to human disposition for social learning, research has demonstrated that capacity for innovation is somewhat weaker. However, the majority of innovation studies test innovative ability at the individual level. The difficulty children demonstrate in these asocial problem-solving tasks may mask their ability for socially-mediated innovations (Rawlings & Legare, 2020).

This chapter will outline and discuss existing research into asocial tool-innovation in children in comparison to their ability to manufacture tools following social demonstrations. The main focus of the chapter will be on examining more recent studies of children’s socially-mediated innovations. Can children use socially-transmitted information flexibly to innovate novel tools?

How do tool techniques develop? The role of cumulative culture

[Definition and brief overview of cumulative culture if not covered in another chapter]

[Main theories suggest human uniqueness in cumulative evolution due to high fidelity social learning- active teaching and imitation.]

Whilst these lines of research have focused on the important questions surrounding the uniqueness of human cumulative culture and its evolutionary origins. The second component of cumulative culture – innovation has been somewhat neglected. Developmental Psychology is one approach that has been taken to investigate the potential origins of innovative ability in humans.

Children’s tool making: Independent (asocial) Tool Innovation

In contrast to children’s ability to faithfully replicate tool behaviours seen in others, children display great difficulty in innovating a simple tool for themselves. The most commonly used tool-innovation paradigm requires children to generate the idea of and manufacture a hooked tool from a pipecleaner in order to hook a bucket out of a tall narrow tube (Beck et al., 2011) (see Figure 1.). This task was based on a study conducted with New Caledonian crows (Weir et al., 2001), in which a female crow “Betty” spontaneously manufactured a wire hook to solve the task when her mate “Abel” flew away with the tool needed to solve the problem. Children aged between 3 and 10 were tested on the task, along with a ‘mature’ sample of 16-year-olds. When asked to retrieve the bucket from the tube, children had remarkable difficulty producing the required hooked tool to complete the task. Very few children under the age of 5 were successful, with success gradually increasing with age, with just over half of children successful at age 8 and 80% success at age 10 (see Figure 2.).

Figure 1. Apparatus and Materials used in the “Hooks Task”.
Figure 2. Percentage of children innovating a hook tool in Beck et al. (2011)

Children’s difficulty with the “hooks task” has been shown to be robust across a number of studies conducted by multiple research groups (Cutting, Apperly & Beck, 2011; Neldner, Mushin & Nielsen, 2017; Voigt, Pauen & Bechtel-Kuehne, 2009) and across cultures (Nielsen, Tomaselli, Mushin & Whiten, 2014). Similar levels of success were observed in a sample of African Bushman children whose culture necessitates a higher need to manufacture tools for themselves and consists of fewer pre-made tools than seen in Western society where the majority of tool-innovation research has been conducted.

The majority of studies investigating children’s tool-innovation ability have been based on the “hooks task” paradigm described above. However, a small number of other paradigms have been used and have generated similar findings. Cutting et al. (2011) found similar levels of success on a task requiring children to innovate a long straight tool needed to push a reward from a horizontal tube. Children’s difficulties innovating pipecleaner tools on the vertical tube (requiring a hook) and horizontal tube (requiring a long straight tool) tasks have also been shown to extend to studies requiring tools to be made from other materials (Cutting, 2013; Neldner et al., 2019; Voigt et al., 2009). The “Floating peanut” task requiring children to use water as a tool to retrieve a reward from a vertical tube by floating it to the top is a different paradigm used to test tool-innovation ability. This task has generated similar success levels to the vertical- and horizontal-tube tasks (Hanus, Mendes, Tennie & Call, 2011). Additionally, Mounoud (1996) found children aged four to nine had great difficulty constructing variously shaped tools from Lego in order to push a cube from one location to another inside a puzzle box. Together these studies suggest children’s asocial innovation difficulty to be a robust phenomenon.

Why is independent tool innovation so difficult?

To date, research has focused on how children’s tool-innovation ability may be constrained by cognitive capacity. It has been suggested that children’s poor performance is due to the ill-structured nature of tool innovation (Chappell et al., 2015; Cutting, Apperly, Chappell & Beck, 2014). Most problems we encounter in daily life are well-structured, they have clear start and goal states, and we simply choose between different options available to us. For example, in a tool-choice paradigm we have a start state of an apparatus containing a reward and two available tools, the goal state is to retrieve the reward, and the transformation to get from the start to goal state involves selecting the optimal tool to complete the task. In contrast, tool-innovation is ill-structured. The start and goal states are the same as in the well-structured example but there is little information of how to get from one to the other. The solver must generate and execute the solution for themselves (Jonassen, Beissner & Yacci, 1993; Reitman, 1965). To do this involves executive ability. One must inhibit actions that are incorrect, switch between different strategies and hold information about the problem in working memory. The difficulty of ill-structured problems is that they encompass all executive components in conjunction with each other and cannot simply be reduced to their component parts. The difficulty of ill-structured problems is demonstrated in studies with patients with frontal lobe damage and children with autism. These participants were shown to perform at typical levels for lab-based executive tasks tapping individual executive functions, but performed at comparatively lower levels in ill-structured tasks that required the use of multiple executive functions in conjunction with each other (Goel, Pullara & Grafman, 2001; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; White, Burgess & Hill, 2009). It is therefore likely that the protracted development of children’s executive abilities (Dumontheil, Burgess & Blakemore, 2008) may be a factor in their difficulty with ill-structured tool innovation tasks.

Learning to make tools from others: Imitation and Emulation

The above studies suggest that asocial innovation is very difficult for children. The design of these innovation studies also allows us to observe children’s capacity to manufacture tools following social learning. In these studies, if children were not successful at innovating the required tool for themselves then they next received a demonstration of how to manufacture the required tool, termed the ‘tool-creation demonstration’. This provided children with the opportunity to imitate the correct tool-making method. Beck et al. (2011) and Cutting et al. (2011) provided unsuccessful children with a demonstration in which the experimenter held her own pipecleaner horizontally and manipulated one end to form the required hook tool. Importantly in these demonstrations the experimenter did not show the correct orientation the tool needed to be in or enter it into the apparatus. Despite not being a full demonstration of how to complete the task, the vast majority of children quickly modified their own pipecleaner into the required hook tool and successfully retrieved the bucket from the tube.

These findings are in line with a wealth of research demonstrating that children easily learn how to manufacture their own tools by watching others. From around 30 months infants are able to manufacture a rattle toy consisting of three parts after watching a model (Barr & Wyss, 2008 ; Hayne, Herbert & Simcock, 2003; Herbert & Hayne, 2000).

Later tool-innovation studies included an additional demonstration phase for children. If children were unsuccessful at innovating a hook tool for themselves, they received what has been termed a ‘target-tool demonstration’. In this demonstration the experimenter showed children an example of the end-state tool, giving children opportunity to emulate making the tool needed for the task. As with the tool-creation demonstration described above the end-state target-tool was presented in a horizontal orientation and no demonstration as to how to use the tool on the task was offered. Target-tool demonstrations were included in a number of tool-innovation studies (Beck et al., 2014; Chappell, Cutting, Apperly & Beck, 2013; Cutting et al., 2014; Cutting, Apperly, Chappell & Beck, 2019) yielding modest improvements in children’s ability to succeed on the task. Children aged 6 to 7 were better able to emulate making a successful tool after seeing a target-tool example than younger children (Chappell et al., 2013). The majority of younger children required the full tool-creation demonstration in order to successfully complete the task.

Summary: Independent (asocial) innovation

So far, the presented research has shown that children find it extremely difficult to innovate simple novel tools for themselves and this is in contrast to their aptitude to learn how to manufacture tools from others. This fits with existing evidence suggesting the uniqueness of human culture is due to high fidelity social learning. But for culture (in this case tools) to evolve then innovation is crucial. Whilst innovations could occur by individuals in complete isolation, the difficulty of innovation and the structure of our social groups suggests this to be unlikely. So how do innovations occur?

Whilst tool innovation undoubtedly involves executive skills, and it is likely this that makes it difficult, we must consider whether the tool innovation paradigms discussed so far truly capture the nature of innovations that occur in real-life. These paradigms require children to work independently to create a novel solution they will not have encountered before. Although children will have experienced the properties of pipecleaners and have knowledge of hooks, the requirement to create this novel tool is very much a step-change. Whilst such step-change innovations do occur they are likely to be a rare form of innovation. Most innovations consist of smaller, progressive modifications that accumulate over time within a social environment. The next section explores research that has looked at the scaffolding of innovations and how children use social information to help them construct novel tools without the need for full demonstrations of tool manufacture.

Socially-mediated Tool Innovation: Can information from others help children to innovate tools?

Many studies have aimed to investigate the mechanisms underlying tool-innovation to try to establish where children’s difficulty lay. Although not the stated purpose of these studies, their design of providing information to children within a social context allows us to draw some conclusions surrounding socially-mediated innovations more akin to those likely to occur in real-life. This section will outline these studies and discuss the contribution they make to our understanding of children’s ability for socially-mediated innovations.

Affordances

Although children are presumed to have knowledge of the pliable properties of pipecleaners, this was confirmed by a study in which one group of children took part in a warm-up exercise manipulating pipecleaners by winding them around a pen and creating spiral shapes (Beck et al., 2011). Highlighting the affordance of the pipecleaners in this social manner did not improve innovation and was therefore taken as evidence that children already possessed knowledge of pipecleaner properties.

As stated previously, one of the main difficulties of the current tool-innovation paradigms is the high cognitive load placed on children. They must first generate the idea of a hook tool and then recognise the utility of the pipecleaner in allowing them to achieve this. The tool-choice paradigm presented by Beck and colleagues (2011) demonstrated that children could easily recognise the utility of a hooked tool, quickly and effectively using it to solve the task, however this task did not have an innovative component. Neldner et al. (2017) sought to reduce cognitive load whilst maintaining the need for innovation. In this study children were presented with a hook tool that had the non-hooked end curled over preventing it from entering the apparatus. The provision of the focal affordance (hook shape) as visual information reduces cognitive load as children were only required to recognise rather than generate the appropriate affordance of the material. Children aged 3 to 5 were nine times more likely to innovate a functional tool when the focal affordance was visible. However, successful innovation was still only seen in 45% of children (compared to 14% in the affordance non-visible condition), showing that although children were helped by the reduction in cognitive load and social information, innovation was still a difficult feat for young children.

Non-functional Tool Examples

Another attempt to scaffold children’s tool innovation was made in a study that presented children with the correct shaped but non-functional tool. Cutting et al. (2019) presented children with oversized pipecleaner hooks with which to solve the vertical-tube problem. However, rather than scaffolding innovation and acting as a prompt for creating the required tool, the presence of the oversized hook appeared to hinder children’s ability. In line with Beck et al. (2011) and Neldner et al. (2019) children easily recognised the affordance of the hook tool, choosing to use it significantly more than the straight pipecleaner. However, children were poor at modifying the non-functional hook into a functional tool, or manufacturing their own correctly sized hook from the straight pipecleaner provided. In fact, compared to a baseline condition where children received two straight pipecleaners, children who received an oversize hook and a straight pipecleaner were less likely to create a functional tool to solve the task. This therefore suggests that the presence of a correct but non-functional tool actually hindered children’s ability to solve the problem at hand.

A number of explanations for this finding were proposed. Building on Neldner et al.’s (2019) cognitive load theory, one possibility is that instead of acting as a clue to help children, the presence of the non-functional hook actually increased cognitive load. In contrast to the Neldner study where children simply needed to recognise the affordance of the hooked end of the material, in this study children needed to not only recognise the affordance of the hook but also realise that it was too big for the task and execute a plan of successful modification. These added requirements may have been more cognitively demanding than simply needing to recognise the solution and executing it for oneself.

Another possible explanation is that children’s behaviour was due to them being pre-programmed to learn from others, especially adults. Adults teach children and provide them with useful information, it therefore seems likely that children expect to receive useful information and help. They may therefore interpret the testing paradigm as a situation in which the adult present is likely to provide useful and relevant information and products. They may therefore expect that the materials they are given are ones that will be needed and will work to solve the task they are presented with. This disposition for social learning may hinder children in the context of innovation, because they are not expecting to innovate, they are expecting to be taught how to solve the problem rather than figuring it out for themselves.

Multiple scaffolds

Cutting et al. (2014) explored children’s ability to use information from others to innovate a hook tool. In this study half of children participated in a pipecleaner bending exercise prior to the innovation task to highlight the affordances of the materials. If unsuccessful on the tool-innovation task children then received a target-tool demonstration. The design of this study allowed researchers to assess children’s ability to use this social information regarding different aspects of the task. It was concluded that children’s main difficulty was with generating necessary information for themselves, i.e. that a hook is needed, that pipecleaners are pliable etc. When given this information children over 5 were able to coordinate it together to create a successful solution to the task. However, children under 5 lacked this flexibility and had great difficulty combining the different pieces of information even when presented by the researcher.

Summary: Socially-mediated innovation

The studies highlighted in this section demonstrate that although small improvements are seen in children’s ability to innovate in more socially supportive environments, children’s abilities still remain low. Young children demonstrate relatively inflexible behaviour in the domain of tool-innovation. Whilst tool-making following full demonstration is easy for children, children struggle to make innovations by modification. In some cases, attempts to support children’s innovation actually had the reverse effect, possibly due to children’s expectations for teaching from adults and reliance on imitation. [These ideas will be expanded on here].

Transfer of tool making knowledge

Asocial and socially-mediated innovation has been shown to be difficult for young children. The next question that arises is whether children show a lack of flexibility in all aspects of their tool behaviour.

Replicating a learnt technique

For techniques to prosper it is important that they are retained for future use (von Hippel & Suddendorf, 2018). The tool-rich world we live in today could not exist if we did not retain information learnt about how to make and use tools. At the first level it is important that once a new technique (e.g. making and using a hook tool) has been learnt, this technique can then be replicated for the same task on future occasions.

Children demonstrate excellent ability to manufacture identical tools on the exact same task following their own initial innovation. Whalley et al. (2017) presented children with three trials of the hooks task and found that children’s success on the task was stable across trials. Children who innovated a hook tool replicated their successful on subsequent trials. Whilst this ability to retain useful innovative information is reassuring, this task is limited in that the trials were presented in quick succession and we are only able to assess whether spontaneous innovations are retained for future use.

Beck et al., (2014) provide more substantial evidence for children’s ability to retain tool making knowledge. Children were tested on the hooks task twice with a three-month gap in-between. In the first presentation of the task children were recorded as successfully innovating a hook tool, or successfully manufacturing a hook tool following either the target-tool or tool-creation demonstration. Successful innovation was then measured at time two. Children retained knowledge of tool making over the three-month period, with the ability to manufacture the tool pre-demonstration in each session rising from 0 to 71% in 4- to 5- year olds and 16 to 68% in 6- to 7- year olds. There was no difference in success at time 2 depending on whether children spontaneously innovate at time 1 or received either of the demonstrations. However, low initial success rates and small sample size may be masking differences in how these factors affect retention rates.

Flexible use of learnt techniques

Whilst exact replication of a technique is important for the retention of that technique, to drive cumulative cultural evolution, techniques need to be transferred to new tasks. The distance between the original task and the new situation will determine how much the technique evolves. In close transfer tasks children demonstrate some ability to flexibly transfer knowledge of making hook tools to tasks that vary only in surface characteristics. Beck and colleagues (2014) presented children with three versions of the hooks task one after the other: the original clear tube and bucket, a shorter green tube containing a blue bucket with closed loop handle and a cuboid clear transparent box with a square yellow bucket. Each task was presented with its own different coloured pipecleaners and string distractors. On each version of the task children were given opportunity to innovate a tool for themselves and then received a tool-creation demonstration if necessary. Performance on the first task was low for all children, with older 5- to 6- year old children demonstrating better ability to flexibly transfer knowledge to the new tasks (5 to 86%) than younger 3 to 5 year old children (4 to 50%).

Children’s ability for far transfer was tested on task requiring them to retrieve rewards from the same apparatus using different materials. Children were unable to transfer their knowledge of hook making with one type of material (pipecleaners) to a second task using the same apparatus requiring them to create a hook tool using different materials (wooden dowels added together) and vice versa (Beck et al., 2014). Despite either independently solving the task by making a hooked tool or being shown how to make a tool, children were unable to use their knowledge of the tool required to make a successful tool from a new material.

Children’s lack of flexibility for far transfer is confirmed by studies requiring children to make two different tools on two different tasks. Knowledge of the affordances of the pipecleaner materials available did not help children to make their second tool after success was achieved (either independently or with social learning) on the first task (Cutting et al., 2011).

Together these studies demonstrate a lack of flexibility in children’s use of techniques once learned. Although children can retain their knowledge of a new technique over time, whether that knowledge was gained independently or learned from another person, children show great difficulty with using their knowledge flexibly to solve similar problems. Therefore, in addition to poor ability to independently innovate simple tools children also demonstrate great difficulty with making minor modifications to their learnt techniques.

General Summary

Children demonstrate a lack of flexibility in the domain of tools. Despite remarkable aptitude to learn how to make and use tools by imitating or being taught by others, ability to innovate simple tools has consistently been shown to be difficult. Initial studies into children’s tool innovation focused on independent, asocial innovation. These tasks yielded very low levels of success and were an important starting point in our understanding of children’s ability to innovate. However, it seems likely these studies do not give us true insight into how innovative abilities develop. Innovations are likely to be much more socially-mediated, and it is important that paradigms capture this. Some recent studies described in this chapter give us some indication as to how children use social information to make innovations by modification, and these suggest a complex picture. More work needs to be conducted in this area, along with new paradigms.

References

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9 Comments

  • comment-avatar
    Mathieu Charbonneau 14 September 2020 (14:12)

    Co-development, innovator age demographics, and the triple engine of cumulative culture
    Thank you Nicola for your early draft. It opens up several questions, but I will focus on two angles. I would like to read what you have to say about these points, but also invite other participants to join in:

    (1) At what age would the capacity for flexible innovation develop more powerfully, and what developmental trajectory does these capacities have at older ages, specifically in regards to techniques and, here, tool-making? In terms of technical knowledge, it would seem that innovators are not to be expected at such young ages, but instead at later ones, if only because tool *makers* would be, I expect, in general much older than the target groups the studies you discuss deal with (e.g., making fish hooks, tying ropes and making nets, knitting, etc.). Or rather, that different techniques for toolmaking are learned and used at different ages, perhaps in relation to cognitive development (e.g., one may learn how to cook or weave before one would learn to do ceramics and metalworking; and I would assume one couldn’t invent a tool at an age earlier than the age when they could produce the tool had they learned how from someone else). In their work on farmers in the Orinoco Delta, Ruddle and Chersterfield (1977) offer a neat ethnographical survey of the age and sex of learners, their principal teacher, the location and duration of training for different techniques related to farming, and how these build up on one another. I would be interested to see whether this kind of “technical enculturation” trajectories map on the developmental psychology of human individuals, and their capacity for innovation. Maybe our anthropologists colleagues would have more to say on this issue?

    (2) The research you review is focusing on innovating a new tool wholesale. However, cumulative culture works mostly through producing modifications to existing techniques and tools (at least in theory). A distinction I use in my work is that between innovations from scratch, where one produces something new on their own, and modifications, where one alters some knowledge they have acquired from others (Charbonneau 2015). Innovations from scratch can initiate technical traditions, but it is really modifications that fuel the cumulative process (in this regard, there is a triple engine of cumulative culture). Am I correct to understand the research you reviewed to focus mainly on the former type of invention? Perhaps far transfer can be seen as a form of modification, but it seems far from the “small, gradual” modifications typically associated to the process of cumulative evolution. Would you expect that the same cognitive mechanisms are involved in producing innovation from scratch and modifying existing knowledge? Or do you think these could rely on different mechanisms? For instance, functional fixedness can act against modification if the modification concerns the function of a tool, but not against innovation since the “to be” tool has not been given a function yet.

    Charbonneau, Mathieu. “All Innovations Are Equal, but Some More than Others: (Re)Integrating Modification Processes to the Origins of Cumulative Culture.” Biological Theory 10, no. 4 (2015): 322–35.

    Chesterfield, Ray, and Kenneth Ruddle. “Traditional Agricultural Skill Training among Peasant Farmers in Venezuela.” Anthropos 74 (1979): 549–65.

    Ruddle, Kenneth, and Ray Chesterfield. Education for Traditional Food Procurement in the Orinoco Delta. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

  • comment-avatar
    Sarah Michelle Pope 16 September 2020 (15:00)

    Hook Innovation vs Tool Innovation…?
    Thanks Nicola, I really enjoyed your chapter. Especially your section regarding how social context or even just the expectation of social information might limit children’s innovativeness. I’ve touched on this a bit in my chapter but would really like to discuss this more thoroughly at some point. That said, I want to focus this comment on the hook task and tool innovation more generally.

    We recently ran the hook task at my field site in the Congo with BaYaka and Bondongo children and found very low hook innovation rates – regardless of age (in prep). However, part of our design involved pipe cleaner distributions two weeks prior to conducting the hook task. During those two weeks we used observational sampling to record naturally occurring pipe cleaner uses. We documented belts, hats, suspenders, rings, glasses, necklaces, crowns….and yet they still failed the hook task. One of our take-aways from this study has been that while making a belt in a friend-group during a play session is not equivalent to directed innovation within the experimental context (which requires much faster, directed means-end processing), perhaps the hook task is not a direct proxy for tool innovation in more naturalistic contexts. You make this point in the introduction and discussion but I’m wondering if you would agree that dev psych has become too reliant on the hook task (and a few other extractive puzzle tasks like Neldner et al. 2019) as our primary measures of tool innovation?

    To me it seems that tool innovation requires specific prior information that is relevant to the task at hand, and is perhaps not necessarily a domain-general cognitive ability. This speaks to Mathieu’s comment…I would suggest that there is no specific age when tool innovation should develop because it is so dependent on their relevant experience with the specific tool to-be-developed. That said, if tool innovation is an emergent property of associative and hierarchical reasoning, memory, affordance learning, or other cognitive mechanisms which themselves progress along consistent developmental trajectories, then it might lead us to the impression that tool innovation does so as well. We found that Bondongo children, who often use hooks to fish, were much more likely to (still very few) to innovate the hook than their BaYaka peers, who rarely use hook-and-line fishing. Of course, this is just speculative, but it seemed that their experience with hooks allowed them to consider that solution more readily. I’m so curious to hear your thoughts though!

  • comment-avatar
    Nicola Cutting 17 September 2020 (15:51)

    Response to Mathieu
    Thank you for your comments Mathieu, and for highlighting interesting studies. I will definitely look these up to help consolidate my thoughts.

    I’ll address your second point first, and then address your first point with reference to Sarah’s comments in a separate post.

    You are correct in that the research I have reviewed focuses mainly on innovations from scratch. And I agree that there are likely to be different mechanisms underlying the abilities to innovate from scratch or by modification. The only study I have conducted that would be classed as modification is Cutting et al. (2019), which is covered only briefly in this early draft. In this study children were presented with an oversize pipecleaner hook that needed to be modified into a smaller hook to successfully complete the task. Compared to a condition where children were given straight pipecleaners, children found modifying a non-functional tool (oversize hook) more difficult, and were less likely to succeed on the task. It is clear that both innovating from scratch and modification are difficult for children, but I think this is likely to be due to different reasons. In line with your suggestion, we have argued against a role for functional fixedness in innovations from scratch, but there may be a role for FF in modification. We suggested the difficulties children displayed in our modification study may have been due to not realising the hook was the wrong size, scale error (i.e. privileging function information over size) or social context (expecting adults to provide you with relevant information/tools). Going forwards, I think research needs to focus on modifications, because as you say these are what fuel the cumulative process.

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    Nicola Cutting 17 September 2020 (17:21)

    Response to Mathieu and Sarah
    (1) At what age would the capacity for flexible innovation develop more powerfully, and what developmental trajectory does these capacities have at older ages, specifically in regards to techniques and, here, tool-making?

    Thanks to Mathieu for this question and to Sarah for your comments.

    I think I agree with Sarah’s suggestion that there is no specific developmental trajectory that easily fits on to children’s general capacity for tool innovation. Whilst children must have the underlying cognitive abilities outlined by Sarah, each tool innovation ‘opportunity’ is very much dependent on children’s relevant experience. This can be seen in a number of studies where there is no correlation between children’s performance on different tool-innovation tasks. And further supported by Sarah’s finding that children with more task-relevant experience do better on the task.

    In the hooks paradigm, it feels like children should be able to complete the task because they have all the relevant knowledge – they know the properties of pipecleaners, they know what a hook is etc., so they should just need to put this information together. The ill-structured problem solving literature suggests that simply having this knowledge is not enough. Knowledge needs to be well-integrated what they term structural knowledge, in order to be used in a flexible manner. This is achieved via experience, fitting with the idea that ability to innovate is very much dependent on our personal experiences related to the task at hand.

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    Nicola Cutting 17 September 2020 (17:34)

    Further response to Sarah
    Thank you for your comments Sarah. I’m looking forward to reading your chapter to see how our ideas align.

    It’s great to hear that this task is being used in more diverse samples, and interesting to see that rates of innovation appear consistent across different cultural groups. But yes, I agree, we have become over-reliant on the hooks task and need to design new paradigms. (Although in my defence, innovating new things has been shown to be difficult :)). I agree with the points you and Mathieu make about tasks requiring innovation from scratch being unrepresentative of the type of innovations seen in natural contexts. Our next step needs to be to find ways to capture these more natural innovations and assess their underlying mechanisms.

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    Valentine Roux 17 September 2020 (20:34)

    Invention needs expertise
    Thank you very much for your paper. As a technologist, I feel the need to define some words like innovation (in line with Mathieu’s comments).
    By definition, invention is an individual phenomenon, while innovation corresponds to the adoption of invention on a collective scale, a distinction originally made by the economist Joseph Schumpeter and since then widely accepted and used by technologists. In other words, invention is a cognitive phenomenon, while innovation is a social phenomenon. When it comes to assessing the role of the individual and his or her intelligent behaviour in the evolution of technology, we look at the invention process only.
    Let us now consider the cognitive and motor skills that has to be developed in order to implement technical inventions, i.e. namely techniques involving new physical principles.
    With reference to studies on the learning of complex skills (Bril, 2018; Bril et al., 2010; Gibson, 1979; Reed, 1988; Reed and Bril, 1996), technical invention can be seen as the result of an exploratory activity of the body-matter-energy system and as the discovery, in the course of action, of the possibilities offered by the environment.
    Now, who are the individuals able to invent? Experimental studies conducted with hard stone bead knappers show that the nature of skills depends on the level of expertise (Bril et al., 2005). The expert is the one who, confronted with the constraints of the task, is able to carry out the course of action according to a dynamic that takes into account both the state of the object and the next stage to be carried out. In other words, the expert has the ability both to detect the appropriate information resulting from the course of action, and to incorporate it into his action. However, expertise does not only consist in tuning as well as possible the properties of the system (task-environment-organism system). The expert is also the one who is able to force the system in one direction or another to adjust to new traits. These new traits may be related to performance problems, to new situations (such as a new raw material) or to disturbances in the system (a defect in the raw material, for example).
    In an evolutionary perspective, the process of adopting a new technique can be compared to that of innovation. More experiments conducted in ethnographic settings (Roux et al., 2018) have shown that inventions are necessarily the results of experts: expertise enables individuals to explore the properties of a task beyond the cultural representations that formed their “way of seeing and doing”, and to assess the advantages of adopting a new technique.
    Thus the hypothesis is that expertise is a prerequisite for technical invention. In this regard, to which extent experiments with children enable to study, at the individual level, the skills required for inventions ?

    Bril, B., 2018. Action, Movement, and Culture: Does Culture Shape Movement? Kinesiology Review 7, 79–87.
    Bril, B., Rein, R., Nonaka, T., Wenban-Smith, F., Dietrich, G., 2010. The role of expertise in tool use: Skill differences in functional action adaptations to task constraints. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance 36, 825–839. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018171
    Bril, B., Roux, V., Dietrich, G., 2005. Stone knapping: Khambhat (India), a unique opportunity?, in: Roux, V., Bril, B. (Eds.), Stone Knapping: The Necessary Conditions for a Uniquely Hominin Behaviour. Mc Donald Institute for Archaeological Research, Cambridge, pp. 53–72.
    Gibson, J.J., 1979. The ecological approach to perception. Lawrence Erlbaum, London.
    Reed, E.S., 1988. Applying the theory of action systems to research to the study of motor skills, in: Meijer, O.G., Roth, K. (Eds.), Complex Movement Behavior: The Motor-Action Controversy. Elsevier Publishers, Amsterdam.
    Reed, E.S., Bril, B., 1996. The primacy of action in development. A commentary of N. Bernstein, in: Latash, M. (Ed.), Dexterity and Its Development. Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale NJ, pp. 431–451.
    Roux, V., Bril, B., Karasik, A., 2018. Weak ties and expertise: crossing technological boundaries. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 25, 1024–1050.

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    Miriam Haidle 19 September 2020 (14:29)

    Inventions, experience, and play
    Thank you very much, Nicola, for your thought provoking paper.

    I fully agree with Valentine’s and Mathieu’s comments regarding the necessary distinction between inventions (individual cognitive) and innovations (social phenomenon) on the one hand and between full scratch inventions and modifications on the other. I would like to add that modifications can affect many facets of a cultural trait. If we take a tool as an example, modifications can affect the material, the form, the function, the actions taken to produce it, and the context of its use (actions, objects the tool is applied to etc.). A new solution can be found for an old problem, or a new problem fitting to an old solution. The transfer can be very modest to significant, and conceptual changes as the most far-reaching inventions (Haidle & Bräuer 2011) are very rare also in adults. The experimental design is restrictive: there is a problem that has to be perceived from a specific perspective and a designated transfer to a solution that has to be taken to be counted as “test passed”. In real life, the children may perceive the situation (interesting thing in a narrow container) differently and consequently chosen different ways from perceived problem to possible solution. They may show a transfer in the one or the other aspect and invent something which does not match the expected outcome. In the lab, the children perceive expectations (they are asked to do something specific) and want to meet these expectations. I wonder if this is not a different situation with different requirements tested.
    Another aspect worth considering is that inventing something or changing parts of a problem-solution-complex is a culturally supported technique itself and increasing experience with transfer (and transferring it to other transfer problems) results in better performance (Brown & Kane 1988). While young children are generally trained to do things in the common way (use the spoon for the soup, not the fork!), grown-up children are more and more trained to adapt to varying situations. Different play experiences (with the family involved) have shown to support engineering learning (Tõugu et al. 2017). I assume children to learn transfers mainly in group settings, and I expect young children to perform better in inventing something in peer groups than individually.

    Brown, A. L., & Kane, M. J. (1988). Preschool children can learn to transfer: Learning to learn and learning from example. Cognitive Psychology, 20(4), 493-523.

    Haidle, M. N., & Bräuer, J. (2011). Innovation and the evolution of human behavior from brainwave to tradition—how to detect innovations in tool behavior. PaleoAnthropology, 2011, 144-153.

    Tõugu, P., Marcus, M., Haden, C. A., & Uttal, D. H. (2017). Connecting play experiences and engineering learning in a children’s museum. Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 53, 10-19.

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    Dan Sperber 20 September 2020 (18:13)

    Downsizing the role of innovation and of imitation
    Thank you very much, Nicola, for your paper. Thank you to all the contributors to this discussion, which underscore both the difficulty and the importance of properly articulating the social and historical perspective with the cognitive (and in particular developmental) psychology perspective.
    Nicola’s paper starts from Legare & Nielsen (2015)’s claim that cumulative culture involves two factors, imitation and innovation. I am afraid this commonly accepted view may not help much bridging the psychological and the social scientific perspectives.
    I agree with Valentine that it would be helpful to distinguish “invention” and “innovation” as she suggests: “invention is an individual phenomenon, while innovation corresponds to the adoption of invention on a collective scale.” Cumulative culture depends on the adoption of some inventions in a community, it does not depend on most or even many people inventing anything or on most inventions turning into cultural innovations. In fact the culture of a community can remain relatively stable without any technical innovation for many generations. The “cumulative” aspect of culture, which is so salient at an historical scale and in comparing human to other animal cultures, is not that relevant to the study of most “traditional” cultures observed over a shorter time period (a period typical, for instance of ethnographic work).
    If this is right, then the psychology of individual invention and its development in childhood – a great topic of research in itself – is relevant but not that central to understanding cultural transmission and evolution.
    Does this mean that, as is often claimed, imitation is the one factor that explains the relative stability of cultural ideas, practices, and tools and to which we migh add the social adoption of inventions which turns them into cultural innovations? Actually, Legare & Nielsen (2015) themselves point to the importance of what they call “flexible imitation,” an almost oxymoronic expression which means imitation with modification, hence not imitation in the sense of copying, and hence not in a sense where it would by itself explain cultural stability.
    As Miriam points out in her comment, modifications – most of which, I take it, do not qualify as inventions – play an important and often explanatory role in cultural transmission and evolution (a role central in cultural attraction theory or CAT – see e.g. Claidière & Sperber, 2010; Claidière, Scott-Phillips, & Sperber, 2014). In fact, I would assume, a series of modifications, none of which qualifies as a true invention, can nevertheless result in a true innovation.

    Claidière, Nicolas, and Dan Sperber. “Imitation explains the propagation, not the stability of animal culture.” Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 277.1681 (2010): 651-659.

    Claidière, Nicolas, Thomas C. Scott-Phillips, and Dan Sperber. “How Darwinian is cultural evolution?.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 369.1642 (2014): 20130368.

    Legare, C. H. & Nielsen, M. (2015) Imitation and innovation: The dual engines of cultural learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 19(11):688–99

  • comment-avatar
    Nicola Cutting 30 September 2020 (10:45)

    Response to Valentine, Miriam and Dan
    Thank you to Valentine, Miriam and Dan for your comments. Apologies for the slow response, the beginning of the new academic year has taken up a lot more time than usual this year!

    I found your comments extremely useful and have a lot of reading to do to fully get my head around the different perspectives. This project is already helping me to gain a wider understanding of the literature, and I look forward to working with you all to create a coherent picture.

    Terminology is extremely important, and I am grateful to Valentine for your guidance on this. Based on my understanding I believe most studies I present in my chapter investigate children’s capacity for individual invention. The findings from my studies appear to fit with the suggestion that only experts can invent. Despite possessing the relevant knowledge required for the task (i.e. pipecleaner properties, need for a hook etc.) children are unable to use this basic knowledge and come up with a solution for the task. To explain this, in my writing I have drawn on the ill-structured problem-solving literature (see Cutting, Apperly & Beck, 2011; Chappell et al., 2015. In line with Valentine’s comments, this literature suggests that only experts have well-integrated knowledge that can be used flexibly to solve problems. The question that arises from this for me, is just how much of an expert do you need to be in order to invent? Studies with children offer us one way to approach this question, as their limited experience with the world means we can more easily manipulate their expertise with techniques, which will hopefully allow us to address this question. Studies by myself and others (the study Sarah outlines above fits in this category) have given children prior experience with the materials and have shown this has little effect on subsequent invention. It appears that more focused and extensive experience is needed to create inventions, something not yet investigated in the developmental literature.

    This leads me nicely to Miriam’s comments about transfer. It seems likely that the idea of gaining expertise and experience in transferring to new problems go hand in hand. I also agree with Miriam’s suggestion that inventions are more likely to occur in group settings. In a pilot study I compared young children’s ability to create a hook tool either in pairs or individually. This study only had a small sample size, but indicates that in children under 5 there was no difference in success, whereas children aged 6 to 7 were more successful in the collaborative condition. I suspect that children’s social cognition may have a role to play in group settings. Future studies need to focus on creating scenarios more akin to natural settings where inventions are likely to take place.

    Miriam also commented on the social expectations that arise from the design of the task. This is something I am very aware of, and that needs to be addressed. To go some way to address this I have tested children on the hooks task whilst I was either present or absent in the room (Cutting et al., in prep). This made no difference to younger children’s behaviours. Older children explored more when alone but did not invent more. Whilst invention rates did not increase, this additional exploration is interesting and may have resulted in better outcomes if the children were given more time. This design goes some way to minimising the potential effects of the social situation (i.e. being watched by a stranger), but the study still took place in a strange place (a science museum) with an unknown person given the instructions. and with a camera pointing at them etc. Therefore, more needs to be done to investigate invention and innovation in more natural settings where children feel comfortable and are not trying to work out what is expected of them in the situation.

    Finally, I turn to Dan’s comment “modifications – most of which, I take it, do not qualify as inventions – play an important and often explanatory role in cultural transmission and evolution (a role central in cultural attraction theory or CAT – see e.g. Claidière & Sperber, 2010; Claidière, Scott-Phillips, & Sperber, 2014). In fact, I would assume, a series of modifications, none of which qualifies as a true invention, can nevertheless result in a true innovation.” This is where I am a little hazy and would benefit from some guidance/recommended reading. Whilst I can see that a modification does not qualify as an invention, I’m not entirely sure where modifications fit within the proposed terminology. I am also unclear on the criteria required for something to be an invention rather than a modification. Any guidance would be much appreciated.

    Chappell, J., Cutting, N., Tecwyn, E. C., Apperly, I. A., Beck, S. R., & Thorpe, S. K. (2015). Minding the gap: A comparative approach to studying the development of innovation. In A. B. Kaufman & J. C. Kaufman (Eds.), Animal creativity and innovation (pp. 287–316). Academic Press.

    Cutting, N., Apperly, I. A., & Beck, S. R. (2011). Why do children lack the flexibility to innovate tools? Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 109, 497–511.